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349 
THE LACK OF ADEQUATE TIME TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES 
UNDER RULE 14A-8(F) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 (the Rule) sought to facilitate “functional corporate de-
mocracy” between a company’s management and shareholders.1 The 
Rule allows shareholders to include proposals in a company’s proxy ma-
terials. Management can, however, exclude a proposal on a number of 
substantive and procedural grounds. Subsection (f) requires that compa-
nies provide proponents with notice of, and an opportunity to correct, 
certain procedural deficiencies.2 Issuers have fourteen days to issue the 
notice and shareholders have the same period to respond.3  
The provision has been a common basis for excluding shareholder 
proposals. Proponents frequently fail to remedy prescribed defects within 
the specified window. In particular, street name holders have had diffi-
culty providing adequate evidence of stock ownership.4 In part this arises 
out of unnecessary complications in establishing beneficial ownerships 
and vague descriptions of deficiencies provided by the company.5 
This paper seeks to address the contours of subsection (f) particular-
ly as it pertains to a shareholder attempting to prove eligibility under the 
Rule. Part II addresses the administrative history of this subsection from 
the original Rule to its subsequent amendments. Part III examines the 
SEC’s no-action letters and other interpretations in connection with the 
eligibility requirement. Finally, Part IV analyzes the SEC’s interpreta-
tions and offers suggestions for the future development of the Rule.  
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY: 14A-8(F) 
Under early versions of the Rule, companies had to include any 
proposal submitted by a “qualified security holder” that was a proper 
  
 1. Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regula-
tion, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1994) (“[T]he SEC promulgated the rule in 1942 to catalyze what many 
hoped would be a functional ‘corporate democracy.’”). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(f) (2011). 
 3. Id. (As a caveat to this rule, a company need not provide a notice of deficiency if the 
deficiency cannot be remedied, “such as if a shareholder fails “to submit a proposal by the compa-
ny’s properly determined deadline.” The company must still comply with 14a-8(j).). 
 4. See e.g., Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 591021 (Feb. 28, 
2008) (Shareholder raises concern in complying with Rule: “this second year in refusal to accept my 
valid printout of holdings with date of purchase shown. Why not ask them to verify themselves that 
dividends paid through their registration agent to TD Waterhouse and transferred to me would prove 
length and value of ownership? I cannot do so, as the registrant has no record of my holdings.”). 
 5. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G (CF) (Oct. 16, 2012), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14g.htm (The Commission is “concerned that companies’ 
notices of defect are not adequately describing the defects or explaining what a proponent must do to 
remedy defects in proof of ownership letters.”). 
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subject for shareholders.6 In 1948, the Commission amended the provi-
sion to add a number of procedural requirements.7 Issuers seeking exclu-
sion of a proposal had to notify the Commission no later than the filing 
of the preliminary proxy materials8 and inform shareholders “as to the 
reasons for such omission.”9  
By the 1950s, the Rule extended to proposals submitted by any “se-
curity holder entitled to vote.”10 The Commission interpreted the lan-
guage to require that the proponent “be a security holder . . . at the time 
he submits his proposals, and that he must remain a security holder at 
least through the record date for the meeting.”11 In addition, the SEC 
clarified that the right applied to both record and beneficial owner of the 
shares.12 
The Commission codified these interpretations in 1976.13 A share-
holder had to own the company’s shares “at the time he submits his pro-
posal” and must “continuously own [the] security through the meeting 
date.”14 The provision sought to assure “that the proponent [maintained] 
an investment interest” in the company until voting took place.15 The sale 
of shares after submission of the proposal, therefore, constituted a basis 
for exclusion.16 The amendments also expressly provided that the right 
applied to any “record or beneficial owner of a security entitled to be 
voted.”   
  
 6. Exchange Release No. 34-3347, 1942 WL 34864 at *10 (Dec. 18, 1942) (“In the even that 
a qualified security holder of the issuer has given the management reasonable notice that such secu-
rity holder intends to present for action . . . a proposal which is a proper subject for action by the 
security holder.”). A “proper subject” turned on applicable state law. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The 
Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8 in the Corporate Governance Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151 
n. 5 (2016).   
 7. Exchange Release No. 34-4185, 1948 WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948). 
 8. Id. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (2011) (“Five preliminary copies of the proxy 
statement and form of proxy shall be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days prior to the 
date definitive copies of such material are first sent.”). 
 9. Exchange Release No. 34-4185, 1948 WL 28695, at *3 (Nov. 5, 1948).  
 10. Exchange Release No. 34-4979, 1954 WL 5772, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1954). 
 11. See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9153 (Mar. 7, 1973) (“To 
interpret the rule otherwise would create the possibility that companies, by virtue of their time 
schedules in preparing and printing proxy material, would have to include in their material proposals 
submitted by persons who never become security holders.”). 
 12. Id; Getty Oil Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8887 (Mar. 15, 1974) (“Inasmuch as 
the proponent has furnished documents to the company which tend to establish that it beneficially 
owns [the shares], it would appear that the [proponent] has satisfied the aforementioned requirement 
of [the Rule].”). 
 13. Notice of Proposal to Revise Proxy Rules, Exchange Release No. 34-12598, 1976 WL 
160410 (July 7, 1976); see also Exchange Release No. 34-12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *2 (Nov. 22, 
1976) (“a proposal may be submitted not only be a record owner of a security of the issuer, but also 
by a beneficial owner as well.”). 
 14. Exchange Release No. 34-12999, supra note 14.  
 15. Id. 
 16. See Norsul Oil & Mining Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 17692 (Mar. 24, 1980) 
(“a document from the Guaranty Trust Company . . . the Company's transfer agent, which indicates 
that [Proponent] sold the 9,000 shares . . . referred to in his proposal . . . Rule 14a–8(a)(1) requires 
that a shareholder proponent continue to be a record or beneficial owner through the date on which 
the Company's meeting is held.”). 
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With respect to beneficial ownership, however, companies received 
the right to demand proof of ownership, with the proponent given 10 
business days to comply.17 The specific time period sought to avoid “un-
necessarily vague” deadlines.18 The ten-day time period, however, had 
exceptions.19 The Commission did not strictly enforce the provision 
when a “proponent made a good faith effort to comply with the . . . re-
quirement” and “was frustrated in that effort by the failure of the [broker-
bank], to respond in a timely manner.”20 For example, a proponent could 
be frustrated when the broker failed to provide the requisite documenta-
tion because of a “clerical error.”21 In those circumstances, compliance 
was “beyond” the proponent’s control.22  
When this occurred the staff did not grant the proponent an exten-
sion of time but instead determined that the proposal could not be ex-
cluded. The decision effectively excused the proponent from providing 
the necessary documentation.23 The Commission, however, never codi-
fied the good faith exception and the approach was quickly abandoned.24   
In 1983, the Commission for the first time imposed a minimum 
ownership threshold for shareholders seeking to submit proposals.25 Pro-
ponents were required to inform companies of the number of shares 
  
 17. Exchange Release No. 34-12999, supra note 14. 
 18. Id. (With regard to subsection (a)(2), Notice, “The specific time deadline . . . was substi-
tuted in the subparagraph at the suggestion of several commenters, who expressed the view that the 
‘reasonable time’ deadline [initial proposed] . . . was unnecessarily vague.”). 
 19. Memorandum to Lee B. Spencer, Jr., from Bill Morley, Proposed Revision of Rule 14a-8 
(March 18, 1982) (“[E]xamples of no-action and interpretive letters which set forth staff positions on 
the various provisions of paragraph (a)(1). For Example . . . Letter to UMC Resources concerning 
the proponent’s obligation to provide documentary proof of his ownership when a good faith effort 
is made within the 10 business days, and the broker fails to act promptly.”); see also Unc Res., Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15448 (May 6, 1980). 
 20. See Texas Instruments Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26535 (Feb. 2, 1981) (“It is 
thus apparent that the [proponent], and within the requisite ten day period, requested the custodian of 
its securities to furnish to [the company] appropriate documentation of its beneficial ownership . . . 
[the proponent] having done all in its power to provide such documentation within the time limits of 
the Rule, its proposal is not excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(a)(1).”). 
 21. Id. (“the [broker] had, due to a ‘clerical error’, failed to notify [the company of the [pro-
ponent’s] ownership of the 4,025 shares of [company] common stock when requested to do so by 
the [proponent]”). 
 22. Id. (“Proponent had made a good faith effort to comply…but was frustrated in that effort 
by the failure of First National Bank of Boston to respond in a timely manner, a circum-
stance…beyond the Proponent’s control.”). 
 23. Id. (“[T]his Division is unable to conclude that the management may rely on Rule 14a–
8(a)(1) as a basis for omitting the proposal from the Company's proxy material.”) 
 24. 1982 Memorandum, supra note 20 (The SEC memorandum makes reference to the good 
faith exception, but the exception sporadically appears from 1980 to 1982 but thereafter does not 
appear in the administrative record.).    
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1983) (At the submission of the proposal, “the proponent 
shall be a record or beneficial owner of at least 1% or $1000 in market value of securities entitled to 
be voted at the meeting and have held such securities for at least one year” and hold the securities 
through the meeting date.); see also Memorandum to Lee Spencer and John Huber, from Linda 
Quinn, Bill Morley and John Gorman, Outline for Revision of Rule 14a-8 (June 7, 1983); see also 
1982 Memorandum, supra note 20 (The Staff Report on Corporate Accountability recommended 
against holding period or specific shareholding requirements for proponents, believing “such a 
change would do little to lower the number of proposals.”). 
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owned and, with respect to beneficial owners, to provide “documentary 
support.”26 Companies could also request “appropriate documentation” 
and owners had fourteen calendar days to respond. The change in the 
time period aligned with the Rule’s other procedural deadlines27 and, 
according to the Commission, provided a “sufficient time to furnish the 
requisite documentary support.”28  
Issuer requests for additional documents were not subject to a speci-
fied time period.  Companies often did not get around to writing the defi-
ciency letters until the final quarter of the year, in preparation for the 
annual meeting.29 Nonetheless, the letter was required. The staff declined 
to issue no-action relief absent a representation by the company that the 
documentary support had been requested.30  
The Commission amended the requirement in 1986 in an effort to 
clarify the process used to establish beneficial ownership.  As proposed, 
issuers were to be required to provide notice of any deficiency in the 
documentary evidence “promptly.” The proposal also provided owners 
with a longer period to produce the requisite evidence.31 In addition, the 
Commission specified that, for beneficial owners, a “written representa-
tion by an independent third party, such as a depository, a record hold-
  
 26. This was not in the proposed rule but added as a result of comments received. See Ex-
change Release No 34-20091, 1983 WL 33272, at *3 (Aug. 16, 1983) (“It was suggested, however, 
that the rule require a proponent to deliver such documentation to the issuer at the time the proposal 
is submitted. Paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 14a-8, as adopted today, has been revised to include such a 
requirement.”); see also 1983 Memorandum, supra note 26 (“[S]everal commentators suggested that 
the Rule require the proponent to submit documentation when he submits the proposal. We propose 
to include that requirement.”). 
 27. Notice of Proposal to Revise Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-19135, 1982 WL 600869 (Oct. 
14, 1982) (The 14 Calendar Day deadline now applied to a proponent submitting proof of eligibility, 
limiting the number of words in a proposal, and limiting the number of proposals submitted.). 
 28. Id; see also Exchange Release No. 34-20091, supra note 27.  
 29. Sun Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45775 (Feb. 28, 1984) (proponent pro-
posal sent March 12, 1983 and company did not respond until December 23, 1983); Consumer 
power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65151 (Jan 3, 1986) (proposal sent April 1, 1985 and 
company did not take action until December 12, 1985); United Telecommunications, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1986 WL 67567 (Dec. 31, 1986) (proposal submitted November 17, 1986 and compa-
ny did not take action until December 16, 1986). 
 30. Cbi Indus. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67566 (Dec. 31, 1986) (“In the absence 
of a representation that the Company requested the documentary support required by Rule 14a–
8(a)(2) and that the proponent did not respond by furnishing appropriate documentation within 
fourteen calendar days after receiving the request, this Division does not concur in your view that the 
proposal may be omitted pursuant to Rule 14a–8(a)(1).”). 
 31. Notice of Proposal to Revise Proxy Rules, Exchange Release No. 34-24552, 1987 WL 
847538 (June 4, 1987). 
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er,32 or broker-dealer” would be “considered appropriate documenta-
tion.”33 
The final amendments replaced the need to provide the request for 
documentation “promptly” with a specific time period. Companies had 
fourteen calendar days to issue the notice of deficiency.34 The fixed time 
period was designed to avoid disputes or interpretive questions.35 The 
Rule also gave proponents twenty-one calendar days to respond. Com-
menters supported the change, noting the difficulty in obtaining the nec-
essary documentary support from third party record holders.36  Finally, 
beneficial owners were required to provide a letter from the broker hold-
ing the shares establishing ownership and conformity with the holding 
period.  
The Commission in 1998 rewrote the Rule “into a more plain-
English Question and Answer format.”37 The various procedural re-
quirements merged to create subsection (f), a stand-alone provision, 
which “establish[ed] a uniform 14-day period” under the Rule. The 
change therefore shortened by seven days the period for beneficial own-
ers to respond to deficiency requests.38 The Commission expressed the 
belief that shorter period would “be sufficient for shareholder propo-
nents” and would “help to streamline the [R]ule’s operation by establish-
ing a single ‘shareholder response period.’”39 Issuers welcomed the 
change.40 Investors did not. As some noted, acquiring the necessary doc-
  
 32. The term “record holder” includes any shareowner listed on a corporation’s stock ledger, 
which is usually the Depository Trust Company registered under its nominee name Cede and Co. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of Rule 14a-8, the Commission takes the position that banks or brokers 
participating in DTC constitute record owners. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (“The written statement must be from the 
record holder of the shareholder's securities, which is usually a broker or bank.”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Exchange Release No. 34-25217, 1987 WL 847542 (Dec. 21, 1987). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Exchange Release No. 34-40018, 1998 WL 254809, at *2 (May, 21 1998) (“Most 
commenters who addressed this proposal expressed favorable views, believing that it would make 
the rule easier for shareholders and companies to understand and follow."); see also Notice of Pro-
posal to Revise Proxy Rules, Exchange Release No. 34-39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *3 (Sept. 18, 
1997) (It is worth noting Congress required that the SEC conduct a comprehensive study of the 
shareholder proposal process, which analyzed whether shareholder access to proposals was im-
paired. As a result to this study, the SEC produced this thoroughly redrafted Rule.). 
 38. Exchange Release No. 34-40018, supra note 28; see also CoBancorp Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1996 WL 80498 (Feb. 22, 1996) (“Assuming the Proponent provides the Company with the 
required information within twenty one days of receipt of this letter, the staff does not believe that 
Rule 14a-8(a)(2) can be relied upon as a basis to omit the proposal.”); C-Cor Elecs., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1998 WL 416663 (July 22, 1998) (“the Proponent had twenty-one . . . calendar days from the 
date of receipt of the Letter (under Question 6 of the New Rules . . . must be postmarked no later 
than fourteen . . . days after receipt) to furnish the Company with the appropriate documentation.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
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umentation often took “more than two weeks to get a broker to research 
and establish continuous ownership of stock.”41  
Subsequent evidence would demonstrate that the criticisms by op-
ponents to the shorter time frame were correct.42 Once the company sent 
the notice of deficiency, the Rule required a quick turnaround by the 
proponent. Beneficial owners, however, failed to respond in a timely 
fashion at least sometimes because of circumstances “beyond” their con-
trol.43  
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION AFTER 1998 TO PRESENT DAY 
The failure to cure deficiencies within fourteen calendar days repre-
sents perhaps the most common basis for omitting proposals under the 
Rule.44 The proponent’s response must be postmarked before expiration 
of the time period.45 While a deficiency can arise as a result of a number 
of procedural requirements, the most frequent concerns the proponent’s 
failure to produce sufficient evidence of beneficial ownership.46 Moreo-
ver, the Commission has applied a rule of strict compliance47 and does 
not recognize an exception for delays occurring in “good faith.”48  
Proponents sometimes fail to adequately respond to a deficiency no-
tice. For example, the fourteen-day period may pass without any re-
sponse,49 the response fails to identify the record holder,50 or the docu-
mentary evidence does not establish a sufficient ownership interest in the 
  
 41. Id. 
 42. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (June 
28, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Shareholder-Proposal-
Developments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf. 
 43. See supra note 21.   
 44. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 43 (For the first time in four years, procedural arguments [i.e., 
timeliness or defects in the proponent’s proof of ownership] were not the most common reason for 
exclusions. It was surpassed by both the substantial implementation and ordinary business exclu-
sions.). 
 45. See Rule 14a-8(f) (response must be “postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later 
than 14 days from the date” the notice was received); see also AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2006 WL 354822, (Feb. 3, 2006) (rejecting argument that proposal delivered to private courier the 
last day of the time period because a “postmark” was only available for materials deposited with the 
US postal service).    
 46. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 43 
 47. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F (CF) (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14f.htm (“[T]he requirements of [the Rule] are highly pre-
scriptive and can cause inconvenience for shareholders when submitting proposals.” The SEC’s 
administration “is constrained by the terms of the rule.”); see also Citigroup Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2002 WL 398746 (Feb. 17, 2002) (SEC allowed exclusion of proposal for missing the 14 day 
deadline by one day.). 
 48. See supra notes 20 and 21 (discussing the brief application of the good faith exception). 
 49. See Genworth Financial, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 154024 (Feb. 13, 2015); 
H. J. Heinz, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1439863 (May 23, 2006).  
 50. See Knight-Ridder, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942721 (Feb. 28, 2003); Usec 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1611605 (July 19, 2002).   
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company.51  Nonetheless, the failure cannot always be attributable to the 
actions of the proponent.  
The inability to respond within fourteen days may occur because of 
an inadequate notice of deficiency from the company or the failure of the 
record owner to provide the required information.  In the former case, the 
Staff has administratively added an additional seven-day period for bene-
ficial owners to supply the required documentary evidence. In the latter 
case, the Staff allows for exclusion despite the lack of culpability on the 
part of the proponent. 
Section 3.01 Issues with the Record Holder 
The Rule imposes a “chore” on brokers by requiring them to issue 
letters on behalf of beneficial owners that contain the required infor-
mation.52 In some cases, they may not adequately perform the required 
chore. The most common failures include letters that do not (1) establish 
ownership as of the date of submission,53 (2) attest to continuous owner-
ship for one year from the date of submission,54 or (3) include the incor-
rect name of the company.55 In other instances, brokers simply do not 
provide the information by the required deadline.  
No-action letters illustrate the logistical difficulties sometimes in-
curred by beneficial owners seeking information from their broker.56 In 
  
 51. See Sterling Capitol Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 385729 (Feb. 25, 2004); Rite 
Aid Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 890010 (Mar. 26, 2009); Agilent Techs., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2004 WL 2694596 (Nov. 19, 2004). 
 52. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 591021 (Feb. 28, 2008) 
(noting that the Rule imposes “a chore upon any proponent’s broker or such handling the ‘street’ 
registration”). 
 53. Viant Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1423489 (June 28, 2002); Gen. Elec. 
Co., 2010, SEC No-Action Letter, WL 5505716 (Dec. 28, 2010); Medidata Sols., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2014 WL 7205665 (Dec. 12, 2014); Peregrine Pharm., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2013 WL 3773974 (July 15, 2013); The Pittston Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 92864 (Feb. 
24, 1999). 
 54. Microchip Tech. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 1526972 (May 26, 2009) (“[A] 
search of the Company's stockholder records has indicated that RBC Capital Markets (United States) 
is a stockholder of record of the Company. However, the RBC Letter does not satisfy the require-
ment of a written statement from the record holder verifying that, at the time the proposal was sub-
mitted, Mr. Dozor continuously held the securities for at least one year.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 316044 (Jan. 26, 2011); H. J. Heinz, 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1439863 (May 23, 2006). 
 55. Transocean Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 178201 (Mar. 15, 2013) (“We note 
that, in response to the request by Transocean Ltd. for evidence verifying beneficial ownership of the 
company's securities, the proponent provided a written statement erroneously verifying beneficial 
ownership of ‘Transocean Management Ltd.’ In our view, this error could not be reasonably attribut-
ed to the information provided by Transocean Ltd. in either its request for evidence or its 2012 proxy 
materials. In this regard, we note that the request was printed on the letterhead of ‘Transocean Ltd.,’ 
with no instructions to verify beneficial ownership of ‘Transocean Management Ltd.’ or to mail the 
requested evidence to ‘Transocean Management Ltd.’”).   
 56. The Boeing Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 7326034 (Jan. 27, 2015) (“De-
spite my repeated insistence that Pershing (as the DTC participant) must provide an ownership letter, 
she was repeatedly denied such by Pershing. I also forwarded the proxy rules, Boeing's deficiency 
letter and all attended documents to try to educate Pershing on this matter. Despite this, Pershing 
refused to provide the letter.”). 
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Pfizer Inc., the proponent engaged in an email battle between the compa-
ny and broker-record holder regarding the timely submission of docu-
mentary proof.57 In order to prove eligibility, the proponent was forced to 
contact the broker’s customer service department, seek reassurance on 
multiple occasions that the processing center mailed the proof in a timely 
manner, and obtain agreement from the broker to execute an affidavit 
attesting to these facts.58 Even with that effort, the company argued that 
the proponent submitted the proof of eligibility seven days before receipt 
of the proposal and therefore did not meet the continuous ownership re-
quirement.59 Upon reconsideration, the staff agreed and allowed exclu-
sion.60 
Section 3.02 Notice of Defect Letter and Extensions to Comply 
The staff has administratively extended the fourteen-day time peri-
od upon a finding that the company issued an inadequate notice of defi-
ciency. The notice must explicitly state the date on which the proposal 
was submitted and inform the proponent of the obligation to respond 
within fourteen calendar days.61 Owners must receive adequate detail 
about the deficiencies in the documentation, including the need for a new 
proof of ownership letter verifying continuous ownership.62 The SEC has 
recommended providing a copy of the Rule with the notice.   
In the case of a notice that does not meet these requirements, the 
staff has sometimes given beneficial owners seven additional days to 
provide the necessary documentation.63 The Commission has done so 
where the company failed to include the submission date for the pro-
posal,64 inform the proponent of what would constitute appropriate doc-
  
 57. Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 738739, (Feb. 22, 2010). 
 58. Id. (On multiple occasions the broker assured proponent that its processing center directly 
provided the necessary eligibility verification to the company. In addition, proponent contacted the 
broker’s customer service regarding the company’s assertion that it did not receive the written state-
ment of verification. The broker agreed to execute an affidavit stating that the processing center 
mailed the eligibility verification to the company on the specified date.). 
 59. Id. (The company argued that this was insufficient to prove continuous ownership because 
it would be impossible to verify ownership as of a future date since the shares could be sold.). 
 60. Id. 
 61. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14b.htm (A company does not meet its obligation to provide 
appropriate notice of defect if, at a minimum, it does not address specific requirements of the rule in 
the notice or attach a copy of the eligibility requirements to the notice.). 
 62. Id. (The proposal's date of submission is the date the proposal is postmarked or transmit-
ted electronically.). 
 63. Id.; see also Bulletin No. 14, supra note 51 (“If . . . no-action response requires that the 
shareholder revise the proposal . . . [the Commission’s] response will afford the shareholder seven 
calendar days from the date of receiving [it’s] response to provide the company with the revisions.”). 
 64. See Ncr Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6513868 (Jan. 24, 2014) (Company 
failed to identify “the specific date on which the proposal was submitted” in the deficiency letter); 
Marathon Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 9319133 (Jan. 4, 2016) (Company 
failed “to inform the proponent of the specific date the proposal was submitted in [company’s] 
request for additional information.”). 
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umentation under the Rule,65 or explain that the proponent needed to 
obtain a proof of ownership letter verifying continuous ownership for the 
one-year period.66   
In Palatin Techs., Inc., the company vaguely notified the sharehold-
er of the problems with eligibility.67 The staff noted that the letter had not 
informed the proponent “of what would constitute appropriate documen-
tation . . . [of] his obligation to furnish a written statement of intent to 
hold the company's stock” and that “the proponent's response must be 
postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the 
date” of notification. The staff granted the proponent seven calendar days 
after receiving the letter to fix the deficiencies.    
The staff also granted extensions in the case of non-delivery or mis-
delivery of the deficiency letter. For example, proponents received an 
extension of time where the company did not issue a deficiency letter,68 
sent the letter to the wrong address,69 or otherwise failed to deliver the 
notice.70 The staff also applied the extension when a company provided 
erroneous information to the proponent concerning the beneficial owner-
ship requirements under the Rule.71  In finding a notice deficient, the 
staff does not apparently make distinctions on the basis of the sophistica-
tion of the proponent.72  
  
 65. Fifth Third Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6701955 (Feb. 4, 2014) (Compa-
ny’s request for additional information describing the proof of ownership was not consistent with 
SEC guidelines. Specifically, company “did not indicate how the proponent could determine who the 
DTC participant [was] for the proponent’s broker or bank.”); Citigroup Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2013 WL 6844384 (Feb. 12, 2014) (Company did not inform proponent of what would “constitute 
appropriate documentation under [the Rule]” in company’s request for additional information.). 
 66. This error includes a company not mentioning the gap in the period of ownership covered 
by the proponent’s proof of ownership letters. See Dst Sys., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 
606197 (Feb. 4, 2014); Marathon Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 9319133 (Jan. 
4, 2016). 
 67. Palatin Techs., Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 22252871 (Oct. 1, 2003) (The letter 
stated the following reason: “You have not provided the information necessary for us to determine 
your eligibility. Please see the regulations at 17 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240.14a-
8(b)(2).”). 
 68. Jpmorgan & Chase Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 653400 (Mar. 7, 2008) (“We 
note, however, the proponent's representation that it did not receive the request from JPMorgan 
Chase to provide such documentary support.”). 
 69. AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 571101 (Feb. 16, 2007) (“We note, howev-
er, that AT&T may have addressed its deficiency notice to an incorrect address.”). 
 70. Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 846608 (Mar. 19, 2007) (“We note, 
however, that it appears that ExxonMobil failed to notify the proponent's designated representative 
of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies under rule 14a-8(b), as instructed by the proponent's 
cover letter.”); Liberte Inv'rs Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 31008129 (Sept. 4, 2002) 
(“Liberté Investors did not provide the proponent an opportunity to provide documentary support 
regarding his satisfaction of the minimum ownership requirement.”). 
 71. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 381476 (Mar. 30, 2000) (“We 
note, however, that Wal-Mart's rule 14a-8(b) request erroneously informed the proponent that she 
need only own $1,000 in market value of Wal-Mart stock, and that she in fact has record ownership 
of at least this amount.”). 
 72. Citigroup Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6844384, (Feb. 12, 2014) (The Compa-
ny’s notice of defect simple stated it needed a written statement from the record holder showing 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The no-action letters raise concerns with the decision to shorten the 
period for responding to a deficiency notice from twenty-one to fourteen 
days, particularly when coupled with the SEC’s use of strict compli-
ance.73 The approach provides little time to fully understand the contents 
of a deficiency notice and properly respond. As a result, the staff has 
been forced to graft onto the Rule what amounts to a seven-day extension 
to resolve deficiency notices lacking in clarity. The Commission has 
granted a seven-day extension frequently.74 Since 1998, the extension has 
appeared in at least 164 no-action letters.75 Of that number, 68 have aris-
en where the company failed to adequately inform a proponent on how to 
properly prove eligibility.76  
A number of problems exist with the current approach. First, the use 
of an extension provides no incentive on the part of companies to im-
prove their deficiency notices. Rule 14a-8(f) requires that issuers issue 
the notice within fourteen days of receipt of the proposal.77 The staff has 
effectively declined to enforce the requirement by excusing inadequate 
notices. The staff instead uses the no-action process to provide beneficial 
owners with notice of the deficiency and then provides a cure period not 
otherwise included in the Rule.  
A better approach would be to treat inadequate deficiency notices as 
the failure to conform to the fourteen-day requirement in the Rule. By 
not properly notifying owners, companies presumably waive the right to 
  
proponent held shares continuously for a year and that the statement must be provided within 14 
days. It did not mention the Rule or indicate when the proposal was submitted.).   
 73. See Bulletin No. 14B supra note 62 (discusses common issues with notice of defects); see 
also Bulletin No. 14F, supra note 47 (discussing common errors shareholders can avoid when sub-
mitting proof of eligibility). 
 74. The staff has also provided a seven-day extension to cure deficiencies under other sections 
of the Rule. See Paccar Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 3048477 (Dec. 27, 2004) (“unable to 
concur…under rule 14a-8(i)(3) . . . . It appears . . . this defect could be cured if the proposals were 
revised.”); Torotel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 2480253 (Aug. 29, 2007) (“There appears 
to be some basis…that Torotel may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(1) as an improper 
subject for shareholder action under applicable state law or rule 14a-8(i)(2) because it would, if 
implemented, cause Torotel to violate state law . . . this defect could be cured, however, if the pro-
posal were recast as a recommendation or request.”). See also Rule 14a-8: SEC Granting Seven-Day 
Extension Since 1998, available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/empirical/Rule-14a-8-SEC-Comission-Granting-Seven-Day-Extenion.pdf (The staff has 
applied this extension to other substance grounds for exclusion, albeit with less frequency.). 
 75. See Seven-Day Extension, supra note 75.  
 76. Id. The staff has sometimes granted multiple extensions, with the implicit understanding 
that each extension ran congruently. See Mirant Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 354938 
(Jan. 28, 2003) (In addition to the extension for the company’s deficient notice letter, the staff grant-
ed three additional seven day extension on substantive grounds. The staff granted an extension for 
the following reasoning: (1) allowed the proponent to recast the proposal as a recommendation to the 
board of directors; (2) omitted the material misleading information from the proposal; and (3) clarify 
the proposal so that it does not get omitted under the ordinary business exception.). 
 77. 17 CFR 240.14a-8(f) (“Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company 
must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame 
for your response.”). 
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object to any deficiency. Such an approach would be more consistent 
with the language of the Rule and provide issuers with greater incentive 
to ensure adequate deficiency notices. 
In any event, the seven-day time period used by the staff is incon-
sistent with existing requirements and should be lengthened.  Sharehold-
ers currently receive fourteen days to address a deficiency in the docu-
mentation. Yet where the staff finds that a company issued an inadequate 
letter, shareholders have only half the time to address the identified prob-
lems. The shortened period reduces the ability of beneficial owners to 
obtain the required documentation from record owners in a timely fash-
ion. Shareholders should therefore receive the same fourteen-day period 
for responding to the deficiencies identified in the no-action letter pro-
cess.    
The Commission should also consider amending the Rule to length-
en the time given to beneficial owners to respond. The Rule at one time 
provided owners with twenty-one days. Any such extension, however, 
would not solve all of the problems confronted by proponents in provid-
ing the necessary documentation. The SEC should, therefore, take a more 
active role in ensuring that brokers and other record owners provide ben-
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